haku: @all regulation / yhteensä: 2082
viite: 11 / 2082
| Tekijä: | Bernard, S. |
| Otsikko: | Remanufacturing |
| Lehti: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2011 : NOV, VOL 62:3 p. 337-351 |
| Asiasana: | environmental policy competition imperfect competition social planning models |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper introduces a theoretical model of remanufacturing where duopolistic original manufacturers produce a component of a final good. The specific component in need to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers engage in the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum remanufacturability level is also showcased. The main results indicate that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both firms' profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could utilize collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is implemented, collusion should be repressed since the public intervention is better supported by competition. Under certain circumstances, the regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. This result partly supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries obeying environmental regulations can see their profits increase. |
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