haku: @journal_id 124 / yhteensä: 2769
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| Tekijä: | Forgo, F. Fülöp, J. Prill, M. |
| Otsikko: | Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations |
| Lehti: | European Journal of Operational Research
2005 : JAN, VOL. 160:1, p. 252-267 |
| Asiasana: | Game theory Models Climate Change Negotiation |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Negotiations to reduce greenhouse gas accumulation in the atmosphere are modeled as extensive games of perfect information. Various solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium (henceforth as: eql.), reaction function eql., correlated eql. and bargaining solutions are applied, analyzed and computed. |
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