haku: @all weak signals / yhteensä: 13
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| Tekijä: | Black, J. Bulkley, G. |
| Otsikko: | The role of strategic information transmission in a bargaining model. |
| Lehti: | Economic Journal
1988 : VOL. 98:390, CONFERENCE PAPERS, SUPPL. , p. 50-57 |
| Asiasana: | INFORMATION ECONOMICS BARGAINING GAME THEORY ECONOMETRIC MODELS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The role of information in bargaining is analyzed. The effects of asymmetric information on bargaining are dealt with. The cases of verifiable and non-verifiable signals are differentiated. The consequences from the point of view of effective communication are examined. The situation when a firm is bargaining with a union is discussed. An information advantage may allow an otherwise weak bargainer to extract some surplus for himself. A simple model is presented where it is in the interests of both parties to follow signalling strategies which eliminate the potential inefficiency. |
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