search query: @indexterm regulations / total: 1380
reference: 10 / 1380
| Author: | Fleckinger, P. Glachant, M. |
| Title: | Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate |
| Journal: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2011 : JUL, VOL. 62:1, p. 41-52 |
| Index terms: | social services industries regulations economic policy game theory human relations negotiation |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Does self-regulation increase social welfare? A policy game is developed featuring a regulator and a firm able to unilaterally commit to better environmental or social behavior to preempt upcoming public policy efforts. We demonstrate that the result depends on the variety of policy instruments available to the regulator. Self-regulation increases welfare if the regulator can only use mandatory regulation, but reduces welfare when he opts for a voluntary agreement. This indicates that self-regulation and voluntary agreements are not good complements when welfare is considered. Policy implications are derived and the basic model is extended to several dimensions. |
SCIMA