| Author: | Requate, T. |
| Title: | Pollution Control Under Imperfect Competition: Asymmetric Bertrand Duopoly With Linear Technologies |
| Journal: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1993 : JUN, VOL. 149, p. 415-442 |
| Index terms: | POLLUTION CONTROL MARKET STRUCTURE TAX POLICY DUOPOLY TECHNOLOGY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of decentralizing pollution control policies, such as emission taxes , licenses to pollute and subsidies on output combined with licenses, in a model where price-setting firms compete imperfectly. An emission tax turned out to be not efficient, in general, if both firms are supposed to produce in social optimum. The results of the paper stand in contrast to those in REQUATE (1992) where tax and permit policies were investigated for a different market structure. |
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