Author:Tahvonen, O.
Title:Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources
Journal:Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
1996 : JAN, VOL. 30:1, p. 1-17
Index terms:TRADE
POLLUTION
NATURAL RESOURCES
Language:eng
Abstract:The paper considers nonrenewable resource extraction in a situation where the resource buyers have formed a government which applies emission taxation for slowing pollution accumulation and the sellers are competitive or a resource cartel. The noncompetitive situation is studied as a Stackelberg differential game which the cartel leads. It is first assumed that extraction costs do not depend on the resource stock level and that the pollution stock does not decay. In the time-consistent and Markov-perfect equilibrium the sellers' monopoly power vanishes asymptotically.
SCIMA record nr: 147089
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