Author:Winter, S.
Title:Tournaments und Beförderungsanreize
Journal:Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
1997 : ERGÄNZUNGSHEFT 3/97, p. 129-144
Index terms:HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
CAREER DEVELOPMENT
JOB PERFORMANCE
MODELS
Language:ger
Abstract:Tournament theory analyses the incentive effects of career systems. Conventional models show that tournaments can induce socially optimal levels of effort by contestants. On the other hand, there are indications of negative effects of intermediate information in tournaments. Based on a two- period model the present paper shows these effects. Interme- diate information can result in either to low or to high effort levels. It is argued that it is optimal for the firm to keep information on the relative position of contestants during the tournament secret.
SCIMA record nr: 165811
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