Author:Chatterjee, K.
Lee, C. C.
Title:Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options
Journal:Games and Economic Behavior
1998 : FEB, VOL. 22:2, p. 203-237
Index terms:BARGAINING
ECONOMETRIC MODELS
OPTIONS
INFORMATION
GAMES
Language:eng
Abstract:This article considers a bargaining model in which the seller makes offers and the buyer can search for an outside option. The outside option cannot be credibly communicated and the seller's offer is recallable by the buyer for one period. For sufficiently high search cost, the game ends immediately, otherwise the search occurs in equilibrium. Compared with the case where the buyer can communicate his outside option, the seller is worse off, and the game results in search for smaller set of values of the search cost.
SCIMA record nr: 173492
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