| Author: | Rosenthal, E. C. |
| Title: | Information and strategyproofness in joint project selection |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
1998 : MAY, VOL. 68:2, p. 207-221 |
| Index terms: | INFORMATION RATIONALITY STRATEGY PUBLIC GOODS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In the paper, the following multi-activity public goods problem with excludables is introduced. A group of agents with limited budgets is to select a subset of new technologies to be developed. Each technology has a known cost and may provide different returns, which are private information, to the agents. Agents coordinate their activities through a central administrator. Once purchased, technologies are used freely by all contributors. Through examining information provided to the agents and the administrator, a bounded rationality environment is created and provided a strategyproof selection and cost allocation mechanism under a particular decision criterion. |
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