| Author: | Sudhölter, P. |
| Title: | Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems |
| Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
1998 : JUL/AUG, VOL. 24:1-2, p. 142-171 |
| Index terms: | GAMES COSTS PRICING MODELS THEORIES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Cost sharing rules can be obtained by considering solution concepts on the associated cost games. The Shapley rule, nucleolus rule, and anti-nucleolus rule satisfy "covariance under strategical equivalence." Covariance, together with "equal treatment of equals" and either additivity or consistency, characterize the Shapley rule. The nucleolus rules are axiomatized analogously by changing the definition of the "reduced cost sharing problem" adequately. In the case of concave cost functions, the nucleolus satisfies a strong version of consistency and the anti-nucleolus rule is a core selector. Cost functions for which the proposed game theoretical solutions coincide with average cost pricing are characterized by a simple functional equation. |
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