| Author: | Cox, J. C. Walker, M. |
| Title: | Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1998 : AUG, VOL. 36:2, p. 141-161 |
| Index terms: | DUOPOLY EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS LEARNING MODELS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In the paper, results are reported from experiments designed to determine whether subjects can learn to play Cournot duopoly strategies and whether their out-of-equilibrium play is consistent with the predictions of learning models. The experiments include duopolies with constant and with decreasing marginal costs, and with theoretically stable and unstable equilibria. After a few periods, subjects do play stable interior equilibria but they do not play stable boundary equilibria nor unstable interior equilibria. Subjects' out-of-equilibrium play is inconsistent with the predictions of the learning models. |
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