| Author: | Bråten, J. Golombek, R. |
| Title: | OPEC's response to international climate agreements. |
| Journal: | Environmental and Resource Economics
1998 : DEC, VOL. 12:4, p. 425-442 |
| Index terms: | Environmental economics Oil pollution Air pollution International relations |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors examine a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement (the signatories) and OPEC. The purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income, given a goal on global carbon emissions. As a response to the climate agreeement, OPEC imposes an oil tax on its member states that maximizes OPEC's profits. Within a numerical model the researchers find the subgame-perfect equilibrium the group of signatories chooses to be the leader and the OPEC chooses to be the follower. |
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