Author:Kane, E.
Title:Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulators infer from event-study evidence?
Journal:Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
2000 : AUG, VOL. 32:3 PART 2, p. 671-701
Index terms:INCENTIVES
BANKING
BENCHMARKING
Language:eng
Abstract:Methodologically, this paper frames the opportunity cost of any merger as the value of the alternative deals it precludes or defers. This challenges the standard event-study hypothesis that stock markets benchmark the value of a merger deal by the profits the partners would have earned in stand-alone activity. Substantively, the paper finds that megamergers in banking show two size-related exceptions to the prototypical result that acquirer stock value tends to be unaffected or to fall when a merger is announced.
SCIMA record nr: 222958
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