Author:Moffitt, R.
Title:Welfare work requirements with paternalistic government preferences
Journal:Economic Journal
2006 : NOV, VOL. 116:515, p. F441-F458
Index terms:optimization
preferences
models
work
welfare
Language:eng
Abstract:In the United States (U.S.) and in some other countries, work requirements (hereafter as: w-reqs.) in means-tested transfer programmes have got more important. The theoretical literature considering their possible optimality (here as: opt-y.) generally operates within a traditional welfarist framework. This study considers a case where society instead has preferences over the actual work allocations of welfare recipients. It is shown that opt-y. of w-reqs. is possible but depends on the accuracy of the screening mechanism assigning w-reqs. Numerical simulations show that accuracy must be high for opt-y.
SCIMA record nr: 263008
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