Author:Brenner, S.
Schwalbach, J.
Title:Legal institutions, board diligence, and top executive pay
Journal:Corporate governance
2009 : JAN, VOL. 17:1, p. 1-12
Index terms:board of directors
corporate governance
executive remuneration
management
compensation
pay
USA
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper explores whether the diligence of directors in setting the CEO compensation is affected by anti-director laws and legal director liability rules. Based on a data set covering 27 countries from 1995 to 2005, it is found that independent of managerial risk-aversion, CEO pay is always less generous under stricter anti-director rules and a stronger rule of law. Director liability rules are associated with more generous pay schemes etc.
SCIMA record nr: 276479
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