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Author:Grimm, V.
Riedel, F.
Wolfstetter, E.
Title:Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany
Journal:International Journal of Industrial Organization
2003 : DEC, VOL. 21:10, p. 1557-1569
Index terms:Auctions
Bidding
Telecommunication
Industrial organization
Game theory
Language:eng
Abstract:The second-generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. In this paper it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.
SCIMA record nr: 252901
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