search query: @all nomination / total: 16
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| Author: | Latham, M. |
| Title: | Corporate monitoring: New shareholder power tool |
| Journal: | Financial Analysts' Journal
1998 : SEP/OCT, VOL. 54:5, p. 9-15 |
| Index terms: | Managers Board of directors Shareholders Corporate governance USA |
| Freeterms: | Specialty services |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Shareholder power in the U.S. has risen to the point of replacing an entire board of directors in one stroke. Thus, shareholders should further this advance by taking control of the director nomination process. The way to achieve the goal is through the use of an agency outside the company to nominate company directors. The nominating agency would need to monitor director performance in order to decide whether to nominate a given candidate again for the board of the company. It would solve the free-rider problem and ensure true independence of outside directors. |
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