search query: @all nomination / total: 16
reference: 4 / 16
| Author: | Lara, J.M.G. Osma, B.G. Penalva, F. |
| Title: | Board of directors' characteristics and conditional accounting conservatism: Spanish evidence |
| Journal: | European Accounting Review
2007 : VOL. 16:4, p. 727-755 |
| Index terms: | accounting board of directors companies Spain |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Based on a sample of Spanish listed firms from 1997 to 2002, it is found that firms where the CEO has a low influence over the functioning of the board of directors (hereafter as: i-o-f-b-of-d.) show a greater degree of accounting conservatism. The i-o-f-b-of-d. is measured using two aggregate indexes combining 6 (8) characteristics: board size, proportion of non-executive and independent directors, whether the chairman of the board is an executive director, number of board meetings, and existence of an audit committee (as: c.), a nomination/remuneration c. and an executive c. Overall, this paper's evidence shows that firms with strong boards use conservative accounting numbers as a governance tool, even in an institutional setting with low litigation risk such as Spain. |
SCIMA