search query: @all turnover / total: 1051
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| Author: | Campbell, T. C.(et al.) |
| Title: | CEO optimism and forced turnover |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2011 : SEP, VOL.101:3, p. 695-712 |
| Index terms: | turnover managerial activities investment shareholder value models |
| Freeterms: | CEOs optimism overconfidence biases |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | It is argues theoretically that optimism can lead a risk-averse Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to choose the first-best investment level that maximizes shareholder value. Optimism below (above) the interior optimum leads the CEO to underinvest (overinvest). Based on a large sample of turnovers. It is found that strong empirical support for this prediction. The results are consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial optimism that maximizes firm value. |
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