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| Author: | Bertomeu, J. Magee, R.P. |
| Title: | From low-quality reporting to financial crises: politics of disclosure regulation along the economic cycle |
| Journal: | Journal of Accounting & Economics
2011 : NOV, VOL. 52:2-3, p. 209-227 |
| Index terms: | accounting standards financial reporting regulations business cycles political economy crises debt |
| Freeterms: | lobbying |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper inspects how financial reporting regulations interact with macroeconomic cycles by exploring a positive framework where regulators subject to political pressures respond to cyclical demands by borrowers and lenders. We show that, as economic conditions initially decline, political power moves toward interest groups preferring less financial transparency. It is followed by a counter-cyclical increase in economic activity, as more non-reporting loans are financed, perhaps coincidental with more aggregate uncertainty. During a recession, reporting quality is increased, potentially inflicting a crisis-like adjustment of economic activity to the cycle. Implications for event studies are also discussed alongside with bank lobbying, mark-to-market and cost of capital. |
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