search query: @all best practices / total: 247
reference: 2 / 247
| Author: | Capezio, A. Shields, J. O'Donnell, M. |
| Title: | Too good to be true: board structural independence as a moderator of CEO pay-for-firm-performance |
| Journal: | Journal of Management Studies
2011 : MAY, VOL. 48:3 p. 487-513 |
| Index terms: | executives compensation pay |
| Freeterms: | best practices |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This article tests if board structural independence, and the application of result-based incentive plans, affect the enforcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay-for-firm-performance. A large Australian sample is analyzed using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data estimation. It is found that Australian boards having best practice structural arrangements don't enforce CEO pay-for-firm-performance more than executive-dominated boards. |
SCIMA