search query: @indexterm PAY INCENTIVES / total: 165
references: 39-48 / 165
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39.
Erfolgsbeteiligung bei Aktivitäts- und Risikoverbund
Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
1997 : VOL. 67:3, p. 361-384
 1997 Posselt, T.
40.
Working without a net : time, performance, and turnover under maximally contingent rewards
Journal of Applied Psychology
1996 : AUG, VOL.81:4, p. 331-345
 1996 Harrison, D. A.
Virick, M.
William, S.
41.
The relationships between changes in incentive structures, executive pay and corporate performance : some evidence from the privatised water industry in England and Wales
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
1996 : JUL, VOL. 23:5&6, p. 721-751
 1996 Ogden, S.
Watson, R.
42.
A field study of the impact of a performance-based incentive plan
Journal of Accounting & Economics
1996 : APR, VOL. 21:2, p. 195-226
 1996 Banker, R. D.
Lee, S. - Y.
Potter, G.
43.
Rat race redux : Adverse selection in the determination of work hours in law firms.
American Economic Review
1996 : JUN, VOL. 86:3, p. 329-348
 1996 Landers, R. M.
Rebitzer, J. B.
Taylor, L. J.
44.
Dynamic coordination failures and the efficiency of the firm
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1995 : OCT, VOL. 28:2, p. 223-240
 1995 Goyal, S.
Janssen, M.
45.
Workers' compensation and injury duration: evidence from a natural experiment
American Economic Review
1995 : JUN, VOL. 85:3, p. 322-340
 1995 Meyer, B. D.
Viscusi, W. K.
Durbin, D. L.
46.
Substance and symbolism in CEO's long-term incentive plans
Administrative Science Quarterly
1994 : SEP, VOL. 39:3, p. 367-390
 1994 Westphal, J.
Zajac, E.
47.
Los sistemas de incentivos en las empresas de alta tecnologia.
Alta Direccion
1994 : MAR-APR, 174, p. 137-143
 1994 Martinez Sanchez, A.
48.
Pourquoi la carotte des primes ne marche pas
Harvard-L'Expansion
1993 : HIVER, 71, p. 6-12
 1993 Kohn, A.
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