search query: @journal_id 1275 / total: 203
references: 59-68 / 203
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59.
The strategic use of tying to preserve and create market power in evolving industries
RAND Journal of Economics
2002 : SUMMER, VOL. 33:2, p. 194-220
 2002 Carlton, D. W.
Waldman, M.
60.
Durable-goods monopoly with stochastic values
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : AUTUMN, VOL. 32:3, p. 565-577
 2001 Biehl, A.R.
61.
On information sharing and incentives in R&D
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : AUTUMN, VOL. 32:3, p. 542-564
 2001 Severinov, S.
62.
Inside versus outside ownership: a political theory of the firm
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : AUTUMN, VOL. 32:3, p. 527-541
 2001 Müller, H.M.
Wärneryd, K.
63.
Limited-liability and incentive contracting with multiple projects
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : AUTUMN, VOL. 32:3, p. 514-526
 2001 Laux, C.
64.
Multipollutant markets
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : WINTER, VOL. 32:4, p. 762-774
 2001 Montero, J-P.
65.
Were the acquisitive conglomerates inefficient?
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : WINTER, VOL. 32:4, p. 745-761
 2001 Klein, P.G.
66.
Collateral versus project screening: A model of lazy banks
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : WINTER, VOL. 32:4, p. 726-744
 2001 Manove, M.
Padilla, A.J.
Pagano, M.
67.
Bar codes lead to frequent deliveries and superstores
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : WINTER, VOL 32:4, p. 708-725
 2001 Holmes, T.J.
68.
R&D networks
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : WINTER, VOL 32:4, p. 686-707
 2001 Goyal, S.
Moraga-Gonzalez, J.L.
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