search query: @journal_id 1275 / total: 203
references: 75-84 / 203
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75.
Vertical foreclosure in experimental markets
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : AUTUMN, VOL. 32:3, p. 466-496
 2001 Martin, S.
Normann, H-T.
Snyder, C.M.
76.
Optimal collusion with private information
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : AUTUMN, VOL. 32:3, p. 428-465
 2001 Athey, S.
Bagwell, K.
77.
Incentives versus transaction costs: a theory of procurement contracts
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : AUTUMN, VOL. 32:3, p. 387-407
 2001 Bajari, P.
Tadelis, S.
78.
Tying, investment, and the dynamic leverage theory
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : SPRING, VOL. 32:1, p. 52-71
 2001 Choi, J. P.
Stefanadis, C.
79.
Optimal design of peer review and self-assessment schemes
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : SPRING, VOL. 32:1, p. 27-51
 2001 Baliga, S.
Sjöström, T.
80.
Investment and market dominance
RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : SPRING, VOL. 32:1, p. 1-26
 2001 Athey, S.
Schmutzler, A.
81.
Dynamics of price regulation
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : WINTER, VOL. 31:4, p. 744-767
 2000 Biglaiser, G.
Riordan, M.
82.
Assessing the contribution of venture capital to innovation
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : WINTER, VOL. 31:4, p. 674-692
 2000 Kortum, S.
Lerner, J.
83.
Stretching firm and brand reputation
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : WINTER, VOL. 31:4, p. 658-673
 2000 Cabral, L. M. B.
84.
Customer poaching and brand switching
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : WINTER, VOL. 31:4, p. 634-657
 2000 Fudenberg, D.
Tirole, J.
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