search query: @journal_id 1275 / total: 203
references: 95-104 / 203
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95.
Implicit contracts and the explanatory power of top executive compensation for future performance
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SUMMER, VOL. 31:2, p. 273-293
 2000 Hayes, R.
Schaefer, S.
96.
The Neo-Luddite's lament: excessive upgrades in the software industry
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SUMMER, VOL. 31:2, p. 253-272
 2000 Ellison, G.
Fudenberg, D.
97.
Product innovation by a durable-good monopoly
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SUMMER, VOL. 31:2, p. 237-252
 2000 Fishman, A.
Rob, R.
98.
A dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SUMMER, VOL. 31:2, p. 207-236
 2000 Fershtman, C.
Pakes, A.
99.
The scope and organization of production: firm dynamics over the learning curve
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SPRING, VOL. 31:1, p. 180-205
 2000 Mitchell, M.
100.
The impact of regulation on CEO labor markets
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SPRING, VOL. 31:1, p. 165-179
 2000 Palia, D.
101.
The effects of government-industry R&D programs on private R&D: the case of the small business innovation research program
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SPRING, VOL. 31:1, p. 82-100
 2000 Wallstein, S.
102.
The dynamics of technological adoption in hardware/ software systems: the case of compact disc players
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SPRING, VOL. 31:1, p. 43-61
 2000 Gandal, N.
Kende, M.
Rob, R.
103.
Stock-related compensation and product-market competition
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SPRING, VOL. 31:1, p. 22-42
 2000 Spagnolo, G.
104.
An equilibrium theory of rationing
RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SPRING, VOL. 31:1, p. 1-21
 2000 Gilbert, R.
Klemperer, P.
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