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| Author: | Cramton, P.C. Tracy, J.S. |
| Title: | Strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining: Theory and data |
| Journal: | American Economic Review
1992 : MAR, VOL. 82:1, p.100-121 |
| Index terms: | STRIKES BARGAINING WAGE DETERMINATION TRADE UNIONS UNEMPLOYMENT |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A private-information model of union contract negotiations has been developed in which disputes signal a firm's willingness to pay. Previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike. However, the feature of collective bargaining in the USA is the holdout: negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired, and production continues with workers paid. The union's decision to strike or to hold out is analyzed, and its importance to strike activity is pointed out. It was shown that strikes are more likely to occur after a reduction of wages, or a decline in unemployment. |
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