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Author: | Rubinstein, A. Wolinksy, A. |
Title: | Renegotiation-proof implementation and time preferences |
Journal: | American Economic Review
1992 : JUN, VOL. 82:3, p.600-614 |
Index terms: | CONTRACTS NEGOTIATION (SALES) TIME INFORMATION SCENARIOS |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | The requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotation-proof is investigated. This requirement affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller - buyer scenario in which the information regarding the agent's valuation is nonverifiable. A time dimension is added to an implementation problem, and a natural criterion of renegotation-proofness is introduced for the case of time-consuming renegotiation. The main result is that the addition of the time dimension enlarges significantly the set of contracts that can be impemented in a renegotiation-proof way. |
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