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| Author: | Best, M. Bracken, J. |
| Title: | First-strike stability in a multipolar world |
| Journal: | Management Science
1995 : FEB, VOL. 41:2, p. 298-321 |
| Index terms: | STRATEGY STABILIZATION GAME THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | First-strike stability in a multipolar world measures the incentives of all major nuclear weapon countries, in all possible coalitions, to refrain fro preemptive attack. The analysis integrates the interactions of offensive weapon arsenals, vulnerable offensive weapons within these arsenals, defensive weapons, and value targets reflecting the national asset at stake. The principal finding is that in a multipolar world first-strike capability increases with the deployment of small to medium-sized strategic defenses whereas in a bipolar world it usually decreases. |
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