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| Author: | Comment, R. Schwert, G. |
| Title: | Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
1995 : SEP, VOL. 39:1, p. 3-44 |
| Index terms: | MERGERS MERGERS LAW |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper provides large-sample evidence that poison pill rights issues, control share laws, and business combination laws have not systematically deterred takeovers and are unlikely to have caused the demise of the 1980s market for corporate control, even though 87% of all exchange-listed firms are now covered by one of these antitakeover measures. The authors show that poison pills and control share laws are reliably associated with higher takeover premiums for selling shareholders. |
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