search query: @author Gottinger, H. / total: 1
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| Author: | Gottinger, H. |
| Title: | A model of principal-agency control of wasters under technological progress |
| Journal: | Environmental and Resource Economics
1996 : APR, VOL. 7:3, p. 263-286 |
| Index terms: | WELFARE WASTE MANAGEMENT |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The author analyzes performance and outcome of principal-agency relationship in an environment with pollution externalities and technological progress. The author assumes that firms may not purposely violate the pollution control regulations but nonetheless generate some pollution due to negligence. The models allow firms two possible actions: either to increase the level of treated waste legally or pay an expected penalty if illegal pollution is detected. The authors shows that in a world with pollution externalities, technological progress does not guarantee increases in the welfare level. |
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