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| Author: | Baye, M. Kovernock, D. Vries, C. de |
| Title: | The all-pay auction with complete information |
| Journal: | Economic Theory
1996 : AUG, VOL. 8:2, p. 291-306 |
| Index terms: | ECONOMICS THEORIES INFORMATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All payers forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. The authors fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, the authors show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. |
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