search query: @author Noe, C. F. / total: 1
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| Author: | Noe, C. F. |
| Title: | Voluntary disclosures and insider transactions |
| Journal: | Journal of Accounting & Economics
1999 : JUN, VOL. 27:3, p. 305-326 |
| Index terms: | Information Insider trading Companies Shares Management Pay Forecasting |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the association btw. voluntary disclosures and insider transactions The findings suggest that managers do not make insider transactions to profit from news about their own firms just before it becomes publicly available. However, managers appear to employ other strategies for exploiting private information when making insider transactions. Managers cluster insider transactions after voluntary disclosures when doing so results in more favorable stock prices for them. Also, managers take advantage of knowledge about their own firms' long-term prospects while utilizing voluntary disclosures to shield themselves against profiteering allegations. |
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