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Author: | Clark, D. Riis, C. |
Title: | Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game |
Journal: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
2000 : MAR, VOL. 42:1, p. 109-124 |
Index terms: | ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR ORGANIZATION ALLOCATION |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | The authors consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry: uneveness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules. Only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency; in other cases, the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific. |
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