search query: @author Alexander, J. C. / total: 1
reference: 1 / 1
« previous | next »
Author:Barnhart, S. W.
Spivey, M. F.
Alexander, J. C.
Title:Do firm and state antitakeover provisions affect how well CEOs earn their pay?
Journal:Managerial and Decision Economics
2000 : DEC, VOL. 21:8, p. 315-328
Index terms:CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
COMPANY PERFORMANCE
INCOMES POLICY
Language:eng
Abstract:The relationship between CEO pay-adjusted firm performance and firm-specific antitakeover amendments and state antitakeover laws is examined. The findings suggest that the potential entrenchment resulting from the reduced threat of external control provided by antitakeover provisions may allow the CEO to deliver a lower level of firm performance relative to their compensation.
SCIMA record nr: 226469
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA