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| Author: | Bester, H. Ritzberger, K. |
| Title: | Straegic pricing, signalling, and costly information acquisition |
| Journal: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
2001 : NOV, VOL. 19:9, p. 1347-1361 |
| Index terms: | INFORMATION PRICING SIGNALING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers. Upon observing the price, buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases. Under a belief-restriction, which generalizes the idea of the Cho-Kreps "intuitive criterion", the authors establish a version of the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox: there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices. |
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