search query: @author Kim, I.-G. / total: 1
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Author: | Baik, K. H. Kim, I.-G. Na, S. |
Title: | Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize |
Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
2001 : DEC, VOL. 82:3, p. 415-429 |
Index terms: | Public finance Public goods Equilibrium analysis |
Freeterms: | All-pay auction |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | The authors examine the equilibrium effort levels of individual players and groups in a contest in which two groups compete with each other to win a group-specific public-good prize, the players choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently, and the wiining group is determined by the selection rule of all-pay auctions. They first prove nonexistence of a pure-startegy Nash equilibrium, and then construct a mixed-strategy Nashequilibrium. |
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