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| Author: | Bilbao, J. M. |
| Title: | Voting power in the European Union enlargement |
| Journal: | European Journal of Operational Research
2002 : NOV, VOL. 143:1, p. 181-196 |
| Index terms: | POWER COMPLEXITY EUROPE EUROPEAN UNION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The Shapley-Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which each player is pivotal. The Banzhaf power index depends on the number of ways in which each voter can effect a swing. If there are n players in a voting situation, then the function which measures the worst case running time for computing these indices is in Î (n2'n). The authors present a combinatorial method based in generating functions to compute these power indices efficiently in weighted double or triple majority games and the authors study the time complexity of the algorithms. Moreover, the authors calculate these power indices for the countries in the Council of Ministers of the European Union under the new decision rules prescribed by the Treaty of Nice. |
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