search query: @author Kral, K. L. / total: 1
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| Author: | Coate, C. J. Florence, R. E. Kral, K. L. |
| Title: | Financial Statement Audits, a Game of Chicken? |
| Journal: | Journal of Business Ethics
2002 : NOV-DEC, VOL. 41:1/2, p. 1-11 |
| Index terms: | AUDITING ETHICS GAME THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper uses the intuition from the game of chicken to model client-auditor financial reporting and audit effort strategies. Within an ethical context, the authors' model is concerned with the client misreporting and its detection by the auditor. The paper uses a welfare game (similar to the game of chicken) to more formally model client-auditor strategies. The welfare game is then extended to provide additional insight into ethical and audit effort issues. Such a welfare game provides equilibrium in mixed strategies. This mixed strategy solution makes possible four outcomes from the game: 1) Financial Statements are fairly presented by client and the auditor performs a normal audit, 2) Financial Statements are fairly presented by client and the auditor performs an extended audit (over auditing), 3) Financial Statements are misstated by client. |
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