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| Author: | Nasrallah, W. Levitt, R. Glynn, P. |
| Title: | Interaction value analysis: When structured communication benefits organizations |
| Journal: | Organization Science
2003 : SEP/OCT, VOL. 14:5, p. 541-557 |
| Index terms: | Management science Decision making Game theory Business communication Models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a mathematical model predicting and explaining the circumstances under which a management-defined communication structure can add value to an organization. This model provides a game-theoretical basis for contingent organizational design. There is a multiple-player, non-cooperative game constructed in the study. The difference btw. aggregate effectiveness (=a.e.) at the Nash equilibrium and the maximal feasible a.e. that could be centrally dictated is the value that management can provide through enforcing the globally optimum communication regime. The predictions of this simple model about the conditions that favor more-or less-structured communications agree surprisingly well with accepted organizational contingency theory. |
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