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Author: | Aidt, T.S. |
Title: | Green taxes: Refunding rules and lobbying |
Journal: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2010 : JUL, VOL. 60:1, p. 31-43 |
Index terms: | Europe taxation |
Freeterms: | green taxes refunding lobby groups electoral competition |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | Green taxes can internalize environmental externalities and raise revenues. Herein, developed is a positive theory treating both of these aspects as endogenous outcomes of special-interest and electoral politics. The choice is considered among three refunding rules: income tax cuts, extra public spending and tax burden compensation to polluters. It is shown that a polluter lobby group may lobby for the ecotax revenue to be refunded to voters rather than to its members due to the "price" that the lobby group has to pay for a reduction in the green tax can be reduced by supporting a refunding rule pleasing voters. This study's analysis offers insights into recent European green tax reforms. |
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