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| Author: | Toma, E. F. Toma, M. |
| Title: | Tax collection with agency costs: private contracting or government bureaucrats. |
| Journal: | Economica
1992 : FEB, VOL. 59:233, p. 107-120 |
| Index terms: | AGENCY THEORY TAXATION ECONOMETRIC MODELS TAX COLLECTION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The conditions under which tax payer welfare is higher with government or private collection are examined in the paper. The model developed in the paper argues that agency costs are likely to be zero under any institutional arrangement for tax collection. The model implies that a welfare- maximizing government will be more inclined to choose bureaucratic tax collection the greater the scope for overdetection by the profit-maximizing agent. The extension of the model to tax withholding suggests that this normative conclusion may be overturned. The advantage of private contractors is shown. |
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