search query: @author Campbell, T. S. / total: 10
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| Author: | Campbell, T. S. Chan, Y.-S. Marino, A. M. |
| Title: | Incentives for information production and optimal job assignment with human capital considerations. |
| Journal: | Economica
1993 : FEB, VOL. 60-237, p. 13-26 |
| Index terms: | INFORMATION HUMAN CAPITAL RISK ECONOMETRIC MODELS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors of the paper focus on the structure of optimal incentives to induce the production of information that is valuable in the job assignment problem. The model presented in the paper is relevant for situations where there is long lag before the direct results of the manager's activities can be evaluated. Two cases based on the nature of prior information about the talents of managers have been considered. In one case, it is optimal initially to assign the manager to a routine project and award him a bonus if he can signal that he has high ability. In the other case, the manager is initially assigned to the challenging position, since the expected level of his talent is perceived to be high. |
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