search query: @author Martin, K. / total: 10
reference: 6 / 10
| Author: | Loderer, C. Martin, K. |
| Title: | Executive stock ownership amd performance: Tracking faint traces |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
1997 : AUG, Vol. 45:2, p. 223-255 |
| Index terms: | STOCK OWNERSHIP EXECUTIVES COMPANY PERFORMANCE |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | We examine the realtion between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to be residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth. |
SCIMA