search query: @author Roland, G. / total: 10
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| Author: | Persson, T. Roland, G. Tabellini, G. |
| Title: | Towards micropolitical foundations of public finance |
| Journal: | European Economic Review
1998 : MAY, VOL. 42:3-5, p. 685-694 |
| Index terms: | POLITICAL ECONOMY RENTS INCENTIVES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Observed fiscal policy reflects the incentives embedded in political institutions. In the paper, the effects of two general institutional features are illustrated, that is, separation of powers and legislative cohesion. Compared to a simple legislative game, separation of powers brings about a smaller size of government and lower waste. Legislative cohesion induces a more equal distribution, but more waste and higher taxes, than separation of powers. |
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