search query: @author Verdier, T. / total: 10
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| Author: | Acemoglu, D. Verdier, T. |
| Title: | Property rights, corruption and the allocation of talent: A general equilibrium approach |
| Journal: | Economic Journal
1998 : SEP, VOL. 108:450, p. 1381-1403 |
| Index terms: | ECONOMICS PROPERTY RIGHTS CORRUPTION BRIBERY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper considers an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments. Contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes. It may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully; less developed economies may choose lower levels of property rights enforcement and more corruption; there may exist a "free lunch" such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption, increase investment, and achieve a better allocation of talent. |
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