search query: @author Schaefer, S. / total: 10
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| Author: | Hayes, R. Schaefer, S. |
| Title: | Implicit contracts and the explanatory power of top executive compensation for future performance |
| Journal: | RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SUMMER, VOL. 31:2, p. 273-293 |
| Index terms: | POWER COMPENSATION PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Recent research suggests that implicit incentive contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties. The authors derive and test implications of this insight for the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. If corporate boards optimally use both observable and unobservable measures of executive performance and the unobservable measures are correlated with firm performance, then unexplained variation in current compensation should predict future variation in firm performance. |
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