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| Author: | Goyal, S. Moraga-Gonzalez, J.L. |
| Title: | R&D networks |
| Journal: | RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : WINTER, VOL 32:4, p. 686-707 |
| Index terms: | R&D Economic theory Models Incentives Investment Team work |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | There is a model of strategic networks developed capturing 2 distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and non-exclusive relationships. The analysis highlights the relationship btw. market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing, and efficient. By contrast, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint. This suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links. |
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