search query: @author Noe, T. H. / total: 10
reference: 2 / 10
| Author: | Gillette, A. B. Noe, T. H. Rebello, M. J. |
| Title: | Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence |
| Journal: | Journal of Finance
2003 : OCT, VOL. 58:5, p. 1997-2031 |
| Index terms: | Board of directors Chief executive officers Corporate responsibility |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. The model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdogs" can implement institutionally preferred policies. The model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. |
SCIMA