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Author:Konrad, K.A.
Kessing, S.G.
Title:Time consistency and bureaucratic budget competition
Journal:Economic Journal
2008 : JAN, VOL. 118:525, p. 1-15
Index terms:finance
budget
competition
public sector
employment
time consistency
models
Language:eng
Abstract:In the public sector, high employment protection results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets. Bureaucrats interested in maximizing their divisions' output employ excess labour. Restrictions on hiring decisions can be seen as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. There is provided evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. Decision makers are found to be aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation.
SCIMA record nr: 269636
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