search query: @author Ulph, A. / total: 10
reference: 9 / 10
| Author: | Ulph, A. |
| Title: | The incentives to make commitments in wage bargains. |
| Journal: | Review of Economic Studies
1989 : JUL, VOL. 56:187, p. 449-465 |
| Index terms: | PAY BARGAINING INCENTIVES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | It is commonly believed that the workforce of identical workers will be better organized in a single union than in separate ones bargaining independently with an employer, for this will prevent the employer from playing off one union against another. There are circumstances where this is not the case. If it is possible to sign long-term contracts on wages and employment, then the firm will wish to invest in a capital stock below the efficient level by organising in separate unions the firm will be induced to raise its level by organizing in separate unions the firm will be induced to raise its level of investment, to make a threat to switch production. |
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